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While economic growth in Pakistan has averaged 3 percent 
over the past decade, Vision 2025 envisages it to be over 8 
percent between 2018 and 2025. This ambitious target is 
echoed in the Punjab Growth Strategy 2018, which aims to 
achieve it by promoting private-sector led and export-orient-
ed economic activity through investments in areas such as 
institutional and governance reforms, human capital develop-
ment, improved urban planning, and effective security. Both 
Vision 2025 and the Punjab Growth Strategy acknowledge 
that a large and rapidly growing population could hamper 
growth by pulling investments away from productivity develop-
ment towards expanding needs for education, health, hous-
ing, and other infrastructure. However, they also recognize 
that inherent within the population challenge is a potentially 
tremendous opportunity to boost economic growth.
Punjab is currently undergoing a demographic transition from 
a situation of high fertility and high mortality to one of low-
er fertility and mortality (Figure 1). The resulting bulge in its 
working-age population means the province is poised to reap 
a “demographic dividend”—the boost in income per capita 
and its growth that accrues when the share of working age 
individuals in a population rises relative to dependents, re-
sulting in a higher support ratio,1 as well as increased labor 
supply and savings. As the Asian Tigers have demonstrat-
ed, a robust working-age population can serve as a potent, 
real world pathway for achieving economic growth. However, 
harnessing the powerful thrust of the demographic dividend 
requires the timely execution of a well-conceived plan of ac-
tion involving major interventions in the education, health 
(including reproductive health/population welfare), and labor 
sectors.
Encouragingly, both Vision 2025 and the Punjab Growth 
Strategy 2018 show a strong focus on enhancing the produc-
tive potential of the current and future work force through in-
vestments in education, skills development, and job creation. 
However, while the need to reduce population growth is recog-
Prospects for Economic Growth 
in Punjab under Alternative 
Demographic Scenarios
The Case for a Rapid Fertility Decline
P O L I C Y  B R I E F
Future economic growth is likely to be closely linked, 
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FIGURE 1:  EMERGING BULGE IN PUNJAB’S WORKING-AGE POPULATION
Source: Population Census 1972 Source: Population Council Projections 2015
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nized intuitively, there is relatively low awareness 
that the speed at which fertility declines now in 
Punjab will have a huge impact on the magnitude 
of the economic boost it is able to reap from the 
demographic dividend. A recent study of prospects 
for economic growth in Pakistan under alternative 
demographic scenarios quantified the massive dif-
ferences in growth that can be achieved with slow, 
moderate and rapid fertility decline in Punjab.2 This 
brief presents the study’s key findings to facilitate 
a deeper understanding of the connection between 
the speed of fertility decline and the size of the de-
mographic dividend, and the scale of the economic 
gains at stake.
FERTILITY DECLINE AND 
PROSPECTS OF A DEMOGRAPHIC 
DIVIDEND IN PUNJAB
As fertility declines in Punjab, the rate of growth in the lowest 
tiers of its population pyramid (ages 0-14) is slowing down. 
However, due to the momentum of past high fertility and cur-
rent improvements in infant and child survival, there will not 
be an appreciable change in the rate of growth of the work-
ing-age population for perhaps two decades. In proportion to 
dependents, the working-age share of the total population is 
rising.
To assess the effect of this rising support ratio on future 
economic growth, Bloom, Chen and Sathar (2015) employed 
state-of-the-art theoretical and statistical models designed 
to capture the complexity of economic growth processes and 
their interactions with demographic trends specific to the Pa-
kistani context. The model is outlined in Box 1. Projections of 
the total population were generated for three fertility decline 
scenarios—moderate decline in the total fertility rate (TFR) 
from the current level of 3.8 to replacement fertility (TFR 
2.1) in 2050;3 slow decline in TFR, which would mean that 
replacement fertility is reached sometime after 2050; and 
rapid decline in TFR, implying that replacement fertility is at-
tained before 2050. For population projections, the base year 
was 1998, when the last census was conducted, while 2011 
was taken as the base year for the per capita income and 
demographic dividend comparison. The results of the study 
for Punjab are summarized in Table 1. 
As shown in Figure 2, depending on the speed of fertility de-
cline, the population of Punjab could grow to 184 million or to 
162 million by 2050. Compared to a scenario of rapid fertility 
decline, slow fertility decline implies approximately 15 million 
more young dependents in the population. This will translate 
into a lower support ratio—1.61, as against 1.93 with rapid 
fertility decline (Table 1).
A higher support ratio represents an increase in the produc-
tive capacity of the economy on a per capita basis, which cre-
ates the prospect of a spurt in economic growth—the demo-
graphic dividend. To maximize the size of the demographic 
dividend, the support ratio must be maintained at optimal 
levels while the “boom” in the working-age population lasts. 
Fertility must decline as much as possible to raise the sup-
port ratio, and as fast as possible to allow the high support 
ratio to prevail over a longer period. Figure 3 presents the 
historical and prospective trend in Punjab’s support ratio and 
how it is affected by the pace of fertility decline. Notably, the 
support ratio started to rise in the late 1990s—when energet-
ic efforts were made to increase uptake of family planning—
but it is now beginning to plateau. It can be expected to rise 
significantly if a moderate or rapid pace of fertility decline is 
achieved.
Differences in the support ratio, in turn, lead to wide diver-
gences in the per capita GDP growth attainable (Figure 4). 
In 2050, per capita income in Punjab is expected to be 
“The need for lowering the growth 
rate of population is more urgent 
than ever.” 
VISION 2025
Scenario 1
Slow Fertility 
Decline
Scenario 2
Moderate 
Fertility Decline
Scenario 3
Rapid Fertility 
Decline
Assume TFR
Remains 0.5 
births higher 
than the mod-
erate decline 
assumption
Declines steadi-
ly to 2.1 births 
per woman by 
2050
Remains 0.5 
births lower 
than the mod-
erate decline 
assumption
Total 
Population
183.6 million 172.8 million 162.5 million
Support ratio 1.61 1.76 1.93
Per capita GDP 
Growth
333% 378% 431%
Demographic 
Dividend
122% 168% 221%
TABLE 1:  PROJECTED DEMOGRAPHICS AND ECONOMIC GROW TH 
IN PUNJAB IN 2050 WITH SLOW, MODERATE,  AND 
RAPID FERTILIT Y DECLINE
Source: Bloom, Chen, and Sathar 2015
SEPTEMBER 2015    3
about $4,000 if fertility persists at current levels; a little over 
$5,500, if fertility declines slowly; and about $6,800, if fertil-
ity drops rapidly.
This means that if the fertility rate continues to hover in the 
current vicinity of 3.8, Punjab’s GDP per capita will only be 
about 210 percent greater in 2050 than it is today; howev-
er, if the TFR declines rapidly, Punjab’s GDP per capita could 
grow by as much as 431 percent. In other words, a precipi-
tous decline in fertility could boost income in Punjab by 221 
percent over current levels, independent of any additional in-
come growth that occurs over this horizon. By comparison, a 
slow decline in fertility would lead to a 122 percent boost in 
income, which, significant as it is, represents only about half 
of the dividend achievable.
The results show that, overall, for every one unit of decrease 
in the total fertility rate, GDP per capita is expected to in-
crease by 90-100 percent. Further fertility decline is going to 
be associated with a rise in per capita income, but the level of 
benefits to be accrued will multiply if there is a serious effort 
at interventions that speed up the decline while the support 
ratio is elevated. This is a strong economic argument for in-
vesting in a more rapid fertility decline in the province.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
By 2050, Punjab’s per capita income will be 210 percent 
higher than today’s levels if there is no decline in fertility, but 
431 percent higher if fertility declines rapidly. The scale and 
effectiveness of efforts to reduce fertility levels in Punjab will 
determine whether per capita income in the province grows 
by 333 percent or by 431 percent by 2050. The possible de-
mographic dividend of a 221 percent increase in per capita 
income is simply too huge to be ignored in economic growth 
strategy, especially given Punjab’s burgeoning population, 
resource constraints, and development aspirations. The find-
ings presented in this brief show clearly that, if Punjab is to 
harness the demographic dividend, planners must invest at 
least as heavily and urgently in efforts to raise the contra-
ceptive prevalence rate (CPR) as in interventions to educate, 
train and productively employ the youth bulge.
Time is of the essence. The demographic dividend is a limit-
ed-time offer, and once fertility reaches replacement levels, 
the demographic transition model predicts some semblance 
	  
FIGURE 2:  PROJECTED POPULATION GROW TH IN 
PUNJAB WITH SLOW, MODERATE,  AND 
RAPID FERTILIT Y DECLINE
Source: Bloom, Chen, and Sathar 2015
FIGURE 3:  HISTORICAL TRENDS AND PROJECTED 
GROW TH IN PUNJAB’S SUPPORT RATIO 
WITH SLOW, MODERATE,  AND RAPID 
FERTILIT Y DECLINE
Source: Bloom, Chen, and Sathar 2015
Source: Bloom, Chen, and Sathar 2015
FIGURE 4:  PROJECTED PER CAPITAL GDP GROW TH 
IN PUNJAB WITH SLOW, MODERATE,  AND 
RAPID FERTILIT Y DECLINE
“Our Vision today is to make Pakistan 
the next Asian Tiger.”
VISION 2025
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of equilibrium between fertility and mortality levels. By 2040, 
the bulge that is currently in the working-age tiers will have 
progressed through to older tiers of the pyramid, while a re-
duced population of young people will have entered Punjab’s 
work force. Accordingly, the support ratio will decline and the 
dividend window will close. 
Punjab must act fast to lower its TFR and maintain a high 
support ratio through what is left of the dividend period. The 
process can be kick-started by focusing on eliminating unmet 
need for family planning, which is estimated at 18 percent, 
and represents an opportunity for a rapid demand-driven 
increase in Punjab’s CPR from the current level of 41 per-
cent to 59 percent. This alone will reduce the TFR from 3.8 
to the wanted level of fertility of 2.8 (PDHS 2013). In com-
parison, the Punjab government’s FP2020 goal of raising the 
CPR to 55 percent by 2020 will reduce the TFR to 2.9. While 
increased investment in family planning will be entailed in 
eliminating unmet need, and further efforts will be needed to 
ensure a continuation of the rapid fertility decline trajectory, 
the costs are more than justified by the substantially large 
economic boost achievable.
ENDNOTES
(1) The support ratio expresses the proportion of working-age individuals relative 
to dependents in the population. It is defined here as the working age population 
(15-59) divided by the non-working age population (<15 or>59 years). (2) D. E. 
Bloom, S. Chen and Z. Sathar, “Prospects for economic growth in Pakistan under 
alternative demographic scenarios” (Population Council, Islamabad). (3) The TFR 
measures the average number of children expected to be borne by every woman 
in a population during her lifetime. The model’s TFR assumptions for the three 
fertility decline scenarios are indicated in Table 1.
GDP growth estimations in the model follow the convergence model proposed by Barro (2004). The final multiple regression growth 
equation is derived by manipulating the Solow growth model and states the determinants of the growth of income per capita.
Where yt = log(   ) (Y is aggregate income), w = log(   ) (L is labor force) and Xt denotes time-variant control variables other than demo-
graphic variables. 
The model assumes Sindh’s total fertility rate, which currently stands at about 3.9 children per woman, will decline to the long-run 
replacement level of 2.1 children per woman. The model also assumes that life expectancy in Sindh will increase to 69 years by 2050.
To test the sensitivity to fertility rates, three fertility decline scenarios are considered:
1. Moderate fertility decline (Medium Variant), which assumes that the TFR declines at a steady pace and reaches replacement 
level (2.1 births per women) by 2050.
2. Rapid fertility decline (Low Variant), which assumes that TFR is 0.5 births lower than under the medium fertility (1.6 births per 
woman) assumption throughout.
3. Slow fertility decline (High Variant), which assumes that the TFR is 0.5 births higher than under the medium fertility (2.6 births 
per woman) assumption throughout. 
An indicator “IDD” is introduced, which measures the relative size of demographic dividend and is defined as
IDDi  =                     .     
Where yi2050 is the GDP per capita in 2050 under scenario i, y
0
2050 is the GDP per capita in 2050 in base case scenario and y2011 is the 
GDP in the staring year.
Source: Derived from Bloom, Chen, and Sathar (2015). 
BOX 1:  MODEL USED TO PROJECT PROSPECTS FOR 
ECONOMIC GROW TH UNDER ALTERNATIVE 
DEMOGRAPHIC SCENARIOS
yt = −αyt + βwt + αwt + δlt + η
T Xt + €tα
Yt
Pt
Yt
Lt
yi2050 – y
0
2050
y2011
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“The speed at which fertility declines now 
in Punjab will determine the magnitude of 
the economic boost it will experience.”
